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COMPETITION AND COHESION - COHERENCE OR CONFLICT? EU 
REGIONAL STATE AID REFORM POST-2006 
Fiona G. Wishlade, European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow G1 1QE 
e-mail: fiona.wishlade@strath.ac.uk  
Abstract 
In 2005 the European Commission adopted competition policy Guidelines regulating 
national regional aid. Mirroring EU Cohesion policy reforms, initially the 
Commission took a ‘hard line’ outlawing national regional aid, except in areas 
designated by the Commission, in order to improve cohesion, competition and the 
efficiency of aid spending. This was successfully resisted by the Member States in 
favour of a more flexible regime. This paper argues that Commission’s approach to 
regional aid reform was flawed and raises wider questions about the relationship 
between national and EU regional policies and the way in which the EU promotes 
cohesion, competition and competitiveness.  
Keywords: 
EU competition policy 
EU cohesion policy 
State aid 
Regional policy 
Regional incentives 
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Assisted areas 
JEL classification: R58, F13, L50 
INTRODUCTION 
Enlargement of the European Union in 2004 focused academic and policymaker 
attention on the implications for EU Cohesion policy reform. In contrast, the potential 
impact of enlargement on Member States own regional policies passed largely 
unremarked, at least by the academic community. Just after the Council agreed the 
Cohesion policy budget for 2007-13, the Commission quietly approved regional aid 
Guidelines for the same period, imposing significant new constraints on the design 
and implementation of regional state aid. 
The review of the regional aid Guidelines took place against the backdrop of 
considerable upheaval in the wider policy context. As well as enlargement and the 
reform of EU Cohesion policy, the Commission was trying to remodel State aid 
control policy and take account of the so-called Lisbon Agenda. Mirroring the 
refocusing of EU Cohesion policy on the poorest regions, the Commission initially 
took a ‘hard line’ – the concentration scenario - in its proposed reforms. It attempted 
to outlaw national regional aid except in areas designated by the Commission, 
claiming that this approach best satisfied the considerations and constraints arising 
from the new policy environment. This was fiercely resisted by several Member 
States, which argued for a more flexible regime – the continuity scenario - with scope 
for Member States to designate their own assisted areas. The continuity scenario 
ultimately prevailed, so that the rules adopted for 2007-13 bear greater resemblance to 
those in place for 2000-6 than to the Commission’s initial reform proposals.  
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 3 
In considering these developments, this article is structured as follows. First, it places 
the reforms in context by setting out the background to regional state aid control 
policy. Second, it traces out the origins of the reforms for 2007-13 and analyses the 
implications of the concentration and continuity scenarios. Third, it questions the 
rigour of the debate about which scenario was best suited to the changing policy 
context. Last, it draws some conclusions about the implications of the new Guidelines 
for national regional policy and wider policy relations. 
BACKGROUND 
State aids have long been a staple instrument of government policy across a number 
of sectors. Commission figures suggest EU25 expenditure of around €40 billion in 
2004 for manufacturing and services.1 Across the EU25 around €800 million of this is 
regional aid (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005a). However, this figure significantly 
underplays true levels of regional aid expenditure because it excludes Structural Fund 
cofinancing of national expenditures and because regional aid for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) is classed as SME aid, rather than regional aid. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that regional aid remains a significant category of expenditure for many 
countries. Importantly, Structural Funds spending is also subject to the state aid rules. 
The use of state aids in economic development policy is controversial. Domestically, 
debates tend to centre on whether subsidies are efficient or effective ways of 
addressing market failure, market imperfections or permanent geographical handicaps 
and whether policy should seek instead to improve the general business environment 
and reduce corporate taxation. This debate is beyond the scope of this article which 
deals with the regulation of state aids at the European level; this is not fundamentally 
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about efficiency and effectiveness (although the Commission has increasingly drawn 
on these arguments) but rather about the distortion of trade and competition in the EU. 
Basic principles of state aid control 
Under the Treaty of Rome (1957) the control of government subsidies was viewed as 
essential to the internal market: as quotas and tariffs were being outlawed, the 
temptation for governments to resort to other forms of protectionism was considered 
likely to increase. Initially Commission action was tentative, but the last two decades 
have seen state aid control rise up the agenda, culminating in the 2005-9 State Aid 
Action Plan – SAAP (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005b) a ‘roadmap’ for reform. 
Moreover, as Commission confidence has increased, so has the scope of state aid 
control. Not only do the rules apply to all publicly-funded intervention, but they also 
impinge on activities as diverse as urban regeneration, broadband access, public 
private partnerships, credit unions and infrastructure provision; they are not limited to 
regulating aid for mobile projects or state-owned companies.  
The underlying principle of the EC Treaty provisions is that state aids are prohibited 
(Article 87(1)). However, the ban is not absolute. There are some mandatory 
exceptions,2 but more importantly, a number of discretionary exceptions are outlined 
in Article 87(3); their interpretation is the exclusive competence of the European 
Commission. Crucially, plans to offer state aid (whether ad hoc or as an aid scheme) 
must be notified to the Commission and approved by it before implementation;3 
unauthorised aid is illegal and may have to be repaid. 
The regional aid derogations: ‘a’ regions and ‘c’ areas 
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 5 
The core of Commission policy on regional aids is its interpretation of Article 
87(3)(a) and (c), which enable regional aids to be exempted from the general ban. 
Article 87(3)(a) concerns “regions where the standard of living is abnormally low or 
where there is serious underemployment” (referred to as ‘a’ regions); Article 87(3)(c) 
covers “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an 
extent contrary to the common interest” (referred to as ‘c’ areas).  
The differences between the two provisions are important and have increasingly 
affected how the Commission authorises aid area maps, the types of aid allowed and 
the aid values permitted. This flows from a European Court of Justice ruling in the 
late 1980s that ‘a’ areas were disadvantaged in relation to the Community as a whole; 
in contrast, it held that ‘c’ areas were those disadvantaged in relation to the national 
average.4 
Following this judgement, and partly as a consequence of the 1988 Structural Funds 
reform, the Commission began to make explicit reference to ‘a’ and ‘c’ areas in 
approving regional aid schemes and maps (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1988a); 
until then, the Commission had been lax in so doing, and its decision-making 
generally lacked transparency. 
Since 1988 the definition of ‘a’ regions has become entrenched in regional aid control 
policy and applied increasingly strictly. The ‘a’ regions are those where GDP per head 
is less than 75 percent of the Community average.5 For its part, the definition of ‘c’ 
areas has been much more fluid and, partly as a result, much more controversial. 
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Regional aid Guidelines 2000-6 
The 1998 Guidelines (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1998) covered the period 2000-
6. Central to the approach was the perceived need to restrict aid area coverage: a 
ceiling of 42.7 per cent of the EU15 population was set.6 Within this, the ‘a’ regions 
contained around 21 per cent of the EU population. The remainder (around 22 per 
cent) was allocated between countries as ‘c’ area population ‘quotas’. For most, this 
resulted in significant aid area cutbacks (compared with the position until 1999), 
although all of Greece, Ireland and Portugal remained eligible for national regional 
aid until December 2006 (see Table 1).  
[Table 1 about here] 
The selection of the ‘c’ areas within the population quotas was a national 
responsibility, but the area designation methodology was severely constrained by the 
Guidelines. Moreover, map proposals were closely scrutinised by the Commission 
and, following protracted negotiations, many had to be amended before the 
Commission would approve them. 
The 1998 guidelines also imposed lower aid ceilings. As before, aid maxima reflected 
the severity of the regional problem; typically, these ranged from 20 per cent to 50 per 
cent of eligible investment, compared with up to 30 per cent and 75 per cent before 
2000.7 
Historically, regional aid control has used guidelines within which aid schemes can be 
authorised, obviating the need for case-by-case analysis of awards to firms. From a 
competition distortion perspective, the downside of this approach was that it sheltered 
thousands of awards from scrutiny of their competition and trade effects. Within the 
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assisted area maps and aid ceilings, there were no constraints on the absolute amounts 
of aid, the capital intensity of the investment or the market power of the recipient.8 In 
the 1990s, the Commission, and to some extent the Council, became concerned at this 
lacuna and various mechanisms were considered, culminating in the 1998 
‘Multisectoral Framework’ (MSF). This required case-by-case recalculation and 
approval of awards to exceptionally large projects. However, the 1998 MSF failed to 
have an impact (WISHLADE, 2003, p 127) and was replaced by the more 
straightforward 2002 MSF (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002b). This 
systematically reduced aid rates available to all projects involving eligible expenditure 
exceeding €50 million. Moreover, the Commission had to individually approve aid for 
investments of more than €100 million where the aid proposed exceeded a specified 
amount. In these individual cases aid would not be authorised if it reinforced a high 
market share or increased capacity in a stagnant sector; the onus was on the Member 
State to demonstrate that this was not so.  
EVOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL AID GUIDELINES 2007-13  
For several reasons the 2000-6 Guidelines could not simply be rolled forward for 
2007-13. In particular, the impact of the 2004 enlargement on average EU GDP per 
head had implications for ‘a’ region eligibility and Member States lobbied intensively 
for special treatment of the affected regions; the Commission was sympathetic, but 
had to reconcile this with its desire to maintain overall discipline. In addition, a legal 
challenge to the Commission Decision on the German regional aid map had resulted 
in criticism of the 1998 Guidelines; the Commission could not ignore these 
observations. Also, there was widespread resentment among EU15 Member States at 
the impact of the 1998 Guidelines; privately some Commission officials admitted that 
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 8 
a repeat of the 1999-2000 map negotiations could not be contemplated. More 
generally, the renewal of the Guidelines could not be isolated either from the future of 
EU Cohesion policy or from the changing context for state aid control – as reflected in 
the four considerations and constraints identified by DG Competition discussed 
below.  
Genesis of a reform  
Early signs that radical change might be countenanced were contained in a 
questionnaire circulated to the Member States in 2003.9 This indicated that the 
Commission’s position on ‘a’, former ‘a’, Outermost10 and sparsely-populated regions 
was “relatively clear”, but opened the debate about what might be acceptable 
elsewhere. In particular, the questionnaire asked whether “investment aid is a relic of 
an obsolete concept of regional aid” and mooted the possibility of prohibiting 
investment aid for large firms outside ‘a’ regions. This line of thinking was fleshed 
out by the Director-General of DG Competition who outlined two “provisional 
scenarios” (LOWE, 2003a), here termed the ‘concentration’ and ‘continuity’ 
scenarios.  
The concentration scenario involved allowing regional aid only in ‘a’ regions and in 
‘c’ areas selected by the Commission (‘earmarked’ areas). The continuity scenario 
was built on a simplification of the 2000-6 approach; in addition to the ‘a’ regions and 
earmarked ‘c’ areas, further ‘c’ areas could be designated by the Member States, 
subject to an overall ceiling of the EU25 population. 
The Director General argued that the concentration scenario would be simpler and 
better satisfy the four considerations and constraints on DG Competition’s agenda, 
namely: the objective of ‘less and better aid’; the need to reconcile the reduction in 
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state aid volumes with the objective of economic and social cohesion; the 
simplification and modernisation of state aid control and a focus on the most 
distortive aids; and experience with the 1998 Guidelines. The Third Cohesion Report 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004, pp xxxiii-xxxiv) soon confirmed the 
Commission view that the concentration scenario should be the basis for future 
regional aid control.  
Concentration scenario proposals – a hard line 
By end 2004, DG Competition had issued proposals for regional aid control post-2006 
embodying the concentration scenario (DG COMPETITION 2004a and 2004b). For 
‘a’ regions, the main change proposed was that the threshold be 75 per cent of EU25 
(rather than EU15) GDP per head.11 The main impact of this (the ‘statistical effect’) 
was to lower the cut-off point for ‘a’ region status and exclude a number of EU15 
regions from eligibility. For the ‘c’ areas DG Competition proposed to replace the 
population quotas with three categories of earmarked region:  
• ‘statistical effect’ regions - those that would have met the ‘a’ region GDP per 
head threshold using EU15 data, but were excluded on the basis of EU25 
averages. Most had ‘a’ status in 2000-6, but some that did not would also 
qualify e.g. Highlands & Islands (UK);12  
• ‘economic growth’ regions - areas that would have outgrown ‘a’ region 
eligibility, even without enlargement, owing to a relative increase in levels of 
GDP per head e.g. Valencia (Spain); 
• sparsely-populated areas - regions with fewer than 12.5 inhabitants per km2 
(mainly in Finland and Sweden).  
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An important element of the proposals was the reduction of maximum rates of award 
(except for SMEs, for which ceilings would be higher). The lower ceilings were 
achieved by reducing nominal award values and setting award rates in gross rather 
than net terms. Moreover, in response to concerns of some Member States about 
cross-border issues, DG Competition proposed a maximum rate differential of 30 
percentage points between neighbouring regions at a national border. 
These proposals represented a very significant shift in the rules governing regional 
aid, effectively outlawing traditional regional aid in much of the EU15. The 
implication of the proposals for the EU25 was a 17 percentage-point cutback in 
coverage from 52 per cent of the population in 2000-6 to around 35 per cent from 
2007 (Table 2). These reductions were unevenly distributed: there would be no aid 
area coverage in Cyprus, Denmark, mainland France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands; several countries, including the UK, would see cutbacks of more than 50 
per cent; elsewhere there would be more modest reductions or coverage would be 
unchanged. 
[Table 2 about here] 
There were also significant implications for maximum award rates. Direct 
comparisons are difficult but, by way of example, a region where the maximum was 
50 per cent net would probably have a new maximum of 30 per cent gross – less than 
half the previous value. 
Finally, the proposals referred to possible new ‘significant impact test’ instruments, 
which would partially compensate for the loss of aid area status by offering greater 
flexibility for ‘non-significant’ aid in all areas. The proposed frameworks on lesser 
amounts of state aid (LASA) and aid with a limited effect on trade (LET) were an 
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important part of the Commission’s strategy to focus resources on cases raising the 
most serious competition concerns. However, they were dropped by DG Competition 
early in 2005.13 They failed to gain widespread support among the Member States and 
it seems probable that the Commission legal services also had concerns. 
A multilateral meeting took place in February 2005, after which Member States were 
invited to submit any further comments; the reactions were diverse. Most of the new 
Member States supported the principle of the approach with its focus on poorer 
regions. However, some (for example, the Netherlands) argued for an even stricter 
approach, with regional aid limited to the new Member States and the phasing-out of 
all regional aid in the EU15. In contrast, many EU15 countries (notably Austria, 
France, Germany, and the UK, which sent a joint letter to the Commissioner for 
Competition Policy) expressed concern at the loss of scope for national policy to 
target underperforming regions. (WISHLADE, 2004). 
Continuity scenario proposals – a ‘U-turn’ 
Against this background, in July 2005 the Commission reversed its position in a draft 
Communication (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005c). There were further meetings 
with and submissions from the Member States; the European Parliament and the 
Committee of the Regions also reported, both criticising the ‘hard line’ on spatial 
coverage (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2005; COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, 
2005). Last, immediately after the European Council agreed the EU budget, the 
Commission issued the final text of the new rules (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
2006). 
The 2006 Guidelines are a retreat from the 2004 proposals and a partial return to the 
approach embodied in the 1998 Guidelines. The most significant aspects of the U-turn 
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concern the reintroduction of an overall population ceiling (43 per cent of the EU25 
population) within which ‘c’ areas may be designated by the Member States (see 
Table 3 – non-earmarked ‘c’ areas). The outcome is a return to the situation where 
every Member State not entirely covered by ‘a’ status has a population quota for ‘c’ 
areas with eligibility determined by the national authorities. The national ‘c’ 
population quotas are, as in the 1998 Guidelines, based on internal disparities in GDP 
and unemployment adjusted to reflect the EU context, but a ‘safety net’ provision 
limits losses to 50 per cent of 2006 coverage and modest transitional arrangements 
apply.  
[Table 3 about here] 
As Table 3 shows, the addition of non-earmarked ‘c’ areas means there were no 
‘losers’ from the continuity scenario, compared with the concentration scenario 
proposals. However, the gains for some countries were non-existent or very modest: 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden see small increases and coverage is unchanged for 
all the new Member States except Cyprus. By contrast, for Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK aid area population coverage is 
increased by between 10 and 50 percentage points. In no case is coverage for 2007-13 
higher than for 2000-6 (compare Tables 1 and 3). 
SATISFYING THE CONSTRAINTS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The evolution of the 2006 Guidelines is the road from DG Competition’s (preferred) 
concentration scenario to the continuity scenario. Opinion is divided among national 
policymakers as to whether this was a deliberate negotiating strategy. It could be 
argued that presenting such a radical proposal at the start essentially ‘softened them 
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up’ to accept rules that were, by contrast, much less stringent, but nevertheless much 
more constraining than the 1998 Guidelines. An alternative view is that DG 
Competition was initially unable, from a technical perspective, to devise proposals for 
nationally-designated ‘c’ areas that disciplined coverage sufficiently; it therefore 
opted simply to eliminate ‘c’ areas, other than those earmarked using EU criteria. 
Whether or not this policy U-turn was planned from the outset, DG Competition quite 
evidently had to square a range of policy objectives, address technical and legal 
challenges and reconcile differing viewpoints. Moreover, its preference for the 
concentration scenario reflected the view that it better satisfied the four key 
considerations identified earlier. This section questions the rigour of this claim.  
Less and better aid 
Of late, the ‘less and better aid’ mantra has become the leitmotif of Commission state 
aid policy (KROES 2005). This sentiment first appeared in the Commission’s 
‘Strategy for Europe’s Internal Market’ (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1999). It was 
endorsed by the 1999 Helsinki European Council and picked up at the Lisbon Summit 
in 2000, which noted the need to: 
“promote competition and reduce the general level of State aids, shifting the 
emphasis from supporting individual companies or sectors towards tackling 
horizontal objectives of Community interest, such as employment, regional 
development, environment and training or research.” (EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL, 2000, p 6) 
By the time of the Barcelona Summit, this objective had mutated somewhat and the 
European Council:  
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“renew[ed] its call to Member States to reduce the overall level of State aid as 
a percentage of GDP by 2003, and onwards, and to redirect such aid towards 
horizontal objectives of common interest, including economic and social 
cohesion, and target it to identified market failures. Less and better-targeted 
State aid is a key part of effective competition.” (EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
2002, p 7)  
The notion of ‘better’ aid is not defined. Nevertheless, a number of elements have 
emerged in recent policy debates, notably: the targeting of aid at clearly identified 
market failures (COUNCIL, 2002); the efficiency and effectiveness of aid 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2002a); and the redirection of aid towards ‘horizontal’ 
objectives and away from rescue, restructuring and sectoral objectives (EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL, 2002). 
Would the concentration scenario for regional aid reform have delivered better on the 
objective of ‘less and better’ aid than the cont nuity scenario? It is plausible to argue 
that reducing aid areas from 52.3 per cent to 35.5 per cent of the EU25 population 
would result in lower state aid expenditure. But would eliminating regional aid in 
most ‘c’ areas make for ‘better’ aid? Neither scenario provided for a clear 
identification of market failures nor for any mechanisms for determining the 
efficiency or effectiveness of policy. The nub of the ‘better aid’ question therefore lies 
in the interpretation of ‘horizontal objectives’. 
As quoted, the 2000 Lisbon summit conclusions cite “regional development” as an 
example of a horizontal objective; by the 2002 Barcelona Council, this focus had 
shifted to “economic and social cohesion”. For the Commission, this has become 
synonymous with targeting ‘a’ regions: “Greater cohesion will only be achieved… 
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…if aid is concentrated on the least developed regions….the so-called ‘a’ regions” 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003, p 6). Taking this narrow interpretation, it is 
clear that the concentration scenario fulfils the ‘less but better’ objective more closely. 
However, under Article 158 of the EC Treaty, the notion of ‘cohesion’ is less 
restricted: “the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of 
development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured 
regions or islands, including rural areas.” Article 159 requires the Member States to 
conduct and coordinate their economic policies “in such a way as, in addition, to 
attain the objectives set out in Article 158.” 
In short, the concentration scenario only delivers ‘less and better aid’ to the extent that 
cohesion policy is synonymous with targeting ‘a’ regions. This narrow interpretation 
which has emerged in recent policy statements is questionable; it limits the scope for 
Member States to tackle “disparities between the levels of development of the various 
regions” as required by the Treaty. 
Reconciling lower state aid volumes with cohesion in an enlarged EU 
The ‘less and better’ objective is closely related to the aim of reconciling lower state 
aid spending with cohesion. The Director General of DG Competition argued that the 
concentration scenario would deliver better on this because the elimination of almost 
all ‘c’ areas would itself reduce state aid spending. Moreover, within the ‘a’ regions, 
aid would not only be more effective but rates of award could be lowered (further 
reducing spending) because of the absence of rate competition from ‘c’ areas (LOWE 
2003a).  
[Table 4 about here] 
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Table 4 illustrates the erosion of rate differentials in the evolution of the 2006 
Guidelines. In the continuity scenario proposals (DG COMPETITION, 2004b), the 
threshold for the poorest grouping was lowered from 50 per cent to 45 per cent of EU 
GDP, excluding around 12 million (Polish and Slovak) inhabitants from this category. 
In addition, the scope for ‘c’ areas to be designated by the Member States was 
introduced, with maximum award rates of 10 to 15 per cent of investment. Last, 
special provisi ns were introduced to limit the aid rate differentials between regions 
in neighbouring countries.  
The adoption of the continuity scenario will certainly result in higher spending in ‘c’ 
areas, although data constraints and the ‘unknown’ of future policy designs make it 
impossible to estimate the scale of such spending. Moreover, the maintenance of more 
extensive ‘c’ areas clearly erodes the rate differential between ‘a’ regions and other 
parts of the EU. However, this does not mean that the continuity scenario fails to 
reconcile cohesion objectives with reduced spending. In practice, this depends, as 
noted earlier, on the interpretation of ‘cohesion’ – is the consideration of cohesion 
from a Commission or Member State perspective? In addition, favouring the 
concentration scenario presupposes an understanding of the impact of award rate 
differentials and an ability to calibrate these to reflect policy objectives. There is no 
evidence of this. Historically, the Commission has rather arbitrarily set award ceilings 
broadly in line with its perception of the regional problem, mainly using GDP per 
head. The resulting pattern of rates and rate differentials bears no direct relationship to 
that which would influence location decisions (which in turn would be likely to vary 
between project types and sectors). More generally, the focus on aid differentials is 
only reasonable if it is assumed that regional policy is solely a means of diverting jobs 
and investment between regions (ARMSTRONG, 1984). 
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Simplification, modernisation and emphasis on the most distortive forms of aid 
Simplification and modernisation are key themes of the reform agenda in the SAAP 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005b). They have primarily been concerned with 
procedural issues and the governance of state aid control. In parallel, the Commission 
has been sensitive to criticism of its formalistic approach and concerned at the 
disproportionate resources involved in scrutinising measures with limited competition 
effects. The DG Competition Director General has observed that “there is the 
impression that we are simply applying rules which aim to curtail state aid as such 
rather than concentrating on controlling aid which really distorts the European single 
market” (LOWE, 2003b, p 1). These concerns led to (unsuccessful) attempts to devise 
a ‘light touch’ approach to measures with insignificant competition implications – the 
LASA and LET proposals mentioned earlier. 
Would the concentration scenario have contributed more effectively to the 
simplification and modernisation agenda and targeted the most distortive forms of aid 
better? At a superficial level, a policy which allows regional aid only in ‘a’ regions 
and earmarked areas is clearly ‘simpler’ than one with wider criteria, but it seems 
doubtful that it could be deemed more ‘modern’. More relevant is the issue of 
competition distortion. In practice, both scenarios focus on aid area coverage and, 
specifically whether Member States should have the scope to designate ‘c’ areas 
beyond those earmarked. It can be argued that the spatial extent of policy is of limited 
relevance to targeting the most distortive forms of aid; instead, competition effects are 
more likely to be driven by sectoral considerations like the extent of international 
exposure or market power. 
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The view that the concentration scenario would better fulfil this criterion implicitly 
assumes that aid is more distortive if offered in a more prosperous region. Historically 
this derives from the interpretation of the Article 87(3)(c) derogation for ‘aid to 
facilitate the development of… …certain economic areas, where such aid does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.’ 
BESLEY and SEABRIGHT (1998) have pointed out that there are few agreed criteria 
for determining when an aid distorts competition. Moreover, evidence to establish 
what is in the ‘common interest’ remain elusive, so that, in practice, an analysis of the 
potential trade impacts has been supplanted by an assessment of whether regional aid 
is justified by social and economic conditions. Even the Chief Economist of DG 
Competition acknowledges that balancing the common interest against distortions of 
competition is not explicitly undertaken in Commission assessments (ROLLER, 
2005). 
Experience with the 1998 regional aid Guidelines 
The last consideration concerns practical constraints. There was considerable 
frustration and resentment among national policymakers at the detailed involvement 
of Commission officials in the selection of aid areas in 1999-2000 (WISHLADE, 
2003); and many acknowledged that they would not wish to repeat the process. In 
addition, the 1998 Guidelines were criticised in litigation brought b  Germany against 
a Commission Decision on the German aid map.14 This action was not successful, but 
the Advocate General questioned the methodology for allocating ‘c’ area population 
quotas between countries and concluded that it breached the principle of equal 
treatment.15 
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Clearly the concentration scenario would have eliminated these issues from the reform 
agenda: restricting ‘c’ areas to those earmarked by the Commission would have 
obviated the need to calculate ‘c’ population quotas and negotiate the aid maps. 
Undoubtedly, the concentration scenario would have responded more simply to the 
issues raised by the 1998 Guidelines, but it is important not to confuse simplicity with 
even-handedness. As the adoption of the continuity scenario has shown, the criticisms 
made by the Advocate General were not insurmountable and the more straightforward 
area designation framework under the 2006 Guidelines suggests that there were ways 
to avoid excessively detailed map negotiations. 
 
WIDER POLICY ISSUES 
This paper has argued that the case for the concentration scenario was self-fulfilling: 
the concentration scenario only delivers better on DG Competition’s constraints and 
considerations to the extent that a restrictive interpretation of ‘cohesion’ is adopted. 
Moreover, the choice presented was false: because both scenarios focused on spatial 
coverage, neither had the capacity, in itself, to address the key issues of ‘better aid’ or 
competition distortion.  
The debate surrounding the reform of the regional aid Guidelines was contrived as a 
choice between options for spatial coverage, based on a narrow view of ‘cohesion’ – 
targeting the ‘a’ regions. The limited focus of the reform options meant that wider 
questions about the relationship between national and EU regional policies and the 
ways in which cohesion, competition and competitiveness are promoted were not 
really addressed in the debate. The discussion that follows seeks to open up some of 
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these issues by situating the new Guidelines in a broader context and considering 
some of their wider policy implications.  
A missed opportunity to decouple national and EU regional policies? 
The new Guidelines are a U-turn in the Commission’s original position, but the spatial 
coverage of national regional policies will still be driven by EU Cohesion policy 
objectives; areas holding less than 8 per cent of the EU25 population are designated 
on the basis of national priorities. The preoccupation with spatial coverage, combined 
with the use of EU cohesion criteria, has implications for subsidiarity and the capacity 
of Member States to design and conduct spatially-differentiated policies. 
There have long been direct links between the control of Member State regional 
policies and the emergence of a bespoke Community regional policy. Early observers 
stressed the importance of Community-level controls over national regional aid as a 
partial substitute for a common regional policy (DEACON, 1982) and from the late 
1980s it became standard Commission rhetoric to promote regional aid control as an 
aspect of cohesion policy (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1988b). As the two policies 
became more closely intertwined, issues of policy coherence, primarily expressed in 
terms of the extent to which the national and the EU assisted areas maps coincide, 
gained prominence (WISHLADE, 2003). BESLEY and SEABRIGHT (1999), among 
others, argued that there was no justification for seeking to ensure map coincidence; 
while VANHOVE (2000) has taken the opposite view. 
The reform of cohesion policy against the backdrop of enlargement created an 
opportunity for a fundamental reappraisal of the targeting and coordination of EU and 
Member States’ regional policies. In spite of some prompts (e.g. the SAPIR report 
(2003) and the UK regional policy White Paper (HM TREASURY et al., 2003)) the 
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emphasis was on how to adapt existing policy rather than on radical reform. A 
discussion of the refocusing of EU Cohesion policy is outside the scope of this paper; 
however, it can be argued that, whilst it is justifiable for enlargement to affect the 
targeting of EU resources, this does not hold for national resources. Enlargement has 
altered the relative prosperity of the EU15 regions, but not their absolute situations; it 
is difficult to justify tighter constraints on national regional policy simply because the 
EU now includes even poorer regions. The chance to reconsider the appropriate 
articulation of EU, national and subnational policies appears to have been missed. 
A blunt instrument for addressing competition distortion 
An important strand of the state aid reform agenda is the focus on the most distortive 
aids. This has partly been driven by the administrative implications of enlargement 
and concerns at the disproportionate resources involved in the scrutiny of measures 
raising few competition concerns.  
Neither of the scenarios proposed addresses th  issue of distortion head-on; in line 
with long-standing trends, the emphasis of the proposals was on the spatial coverage 
of policy rather than on the competitive effects of aid. As long as 20 years ago, the 
Commission itself acknowledged that: “area and population coverage provide a better 
indication of Member States’ regional policy than of the impact of schemes on 
competition” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1986, point 229). 
The main scope for competition distortion to be addressed directly lies in the 
Multisectoral Framework, now brought within the regional aid Guidelines. For most 
projects, the MSF rules are substantially unchanged. However, because maximum 
award values are reduced under the Guidelines, the aid rates available to investments 
exceeding €50 million also fall, as does the aid threshold beyond which projects must 
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be notified individually to the Commission.16 For these projects, if the beneficiary 
accounts for more than 25 per cent of product sales or if the capacity created by the 
project is more than five per cent of the market: 
“the Commission will approve regional investment aid only after detailed 
verification... …that the aid is necessary to provide an incentive effect and that the 
benefits of the aid measure outweigh the resulting distorting of competition and 
effect on trade between Member States” (para 68) 
It is not yet clear quite how this will be operationalised: the criteria to be taken into 
account in making this assessment will be the subject of further guidance (footnote 
63). Nevertheless, the abandonment of LASA and LET and, for now, of a sectoral 
component to the MSF (CAVALLO and JUNGINGER-DITTEL, 2004), which would 
have outlawed aid to certain industries, means that the Commission has scarcely 
sharpened its focus on the most distortive aids. There are reasons to believe that the 
distortion of competition could have been targeted more accurately in two ways: first, 
by pursuing the ‘significant impact’ approach proposed under LASA and LET to 
eliminate minor aid from scrutiny; and second, by exploiting data on aid awards in 
order to better understand their competition effects.17 Instead, regional aid control 
remains a rather blunt instrument essentially regulating geographical coverage and aid 
values. Radical reductions in spatial coverage have seriously constrained aid area 
maps, often prohibiting measures that would have been quite innocuous; at the same 
time, significant reductions in award values may, perversely, reduce the effectiveness 
of aid if rates fall to levels where they cease to influence investment decisions and 
lead to more windfall gains. 
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Implications for international competitiveness 
Much of the concern at the reforms, as expressed by EU15 Member States, centred on 
relocation within the EU and the border effects of high aid differentials. A more 
general issue is whether the reductions in aid area coverage and rates might affect the 
EU’s global competitiveness for mobile investment – will award ceilings and aid 
areas become so limited as to be of no interest to mobile investment? Some are 
sceptical about the capacity of incentives to offset locational disadvantages and rightly 
point to the importance of the general business environment in improving 
competitiveness. However, all EU Member States retain the scope to aid large mobile 
projects and the effectiveness and efficiency of such measures is a domestic 
consideration; the Commission’s remit should be limited to preventing distortions of 
competition that are not in the common interest. Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
EU system of state aid discipline is unique; alternative locations do not display similar 
self-restraint and may offer tax and other advantages that prove irresistible to mobile 
investors. This possibility has been noted by national policymakers; the Spring 2006 
European Council concluded that: 
“taking into account the external aspects of competitiveness, it considers that the 
review of state aid should encourage a high level of investment in Europe and 
make Europe attractive for future investment.” (EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2006) 
It remains to be seen how the Commission will address this issue, but for now there is 
no mechanism to deal a situation in which a single EU location is competing with 
non-EU alternatives. 
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The challenge of area designation 
Behind the tortuous evolution of the new Guidelines, and the relief for many that 
some scope for national regional aid remains, policymakers have faced a considerable 
challenge in designating areas for 2007-13. In many ways the criteria are more 
flexible than before, but it was uncertain how the Commission would apply the rules 
in practice and the population coverage that Member States were free to designate was 
often extremely limited (just one per cent of the population in Italy and Spain) or 
significantly reduced compared with the 2000-6 position. The role of the subnational 
level in regional economic policy and the tradition of consultation in many countries, 
makes map revision politically difficult and administratively costly. Crucially, 
restricted coverage may compromise policy objectives, especially where the targeting 
of rural, urban and restructuring areas has to be shoe-horned into a single regional aid 
map. ARMSTRONG (2001) has in the past warned that lower spatial coverage 
increases the risk of inappropriate ‘policy bending’. This tension is arguably even 
more acute in the context of devolved responsibilities where views may differ about 
economic development needs and the targeting of resources. 
An emerging policy vacuum? 
A key feature of a number of the existing horizontal aid frameworks is that projects in 
designated problem regions may benefit from higher rates of award or more flexible 
conditions. The loss of ‘a’ or ‘c’ area status therefore involves the loss of these 
benefits under the existing horizontal frameworks. The SAAP confirms that many of 
these horizontal frameworks will be revised and consultations have raised the issue of 
whether special treatment of disadvantaged areas under horizontal frameworks is 
justified. Moreover, even where more generous terms are available in the problem 
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regions, the scope may be limited: for instance, in the new Guidelines on aid to 
regional airports (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005d) disadvantaged areas are 
restricted to areas that are clearly defined at EU level and/or are specifically 
recognised in the Treaty, not those identified by Member States. 
More generally, the combined effects of the Lisbon agenda and enlargement are 
shaping EU Cohesion policy and state aid control policy in ways that have significant 
implications for the problem regions of Member States without designated area status. 
On the one hand, the competitiveness agenda promotes horizontal policies (most 
obviously for R&D) that favour the development of all regions, but using policy 
instruments where the impact and uptake is likely to be higher in the more prosperous 
regions, especially under demand-led national schemes; on the other hand, EU 
Cohesion and regional aid control policies target assistance at the least-prosperous 
regions. Unless regional policymakers can influence their horizontal policy 
counterparts, the net effect of this may be to create a policy vacuum for those regions 
that are neither well-placed to benefit from policies focused on innovation or other 
horizontal priorities, nor sufficiently disadvantaged to qualify for regional aid, either 
at the national or Community levels.  
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Table 1: Aid area coverage 2000/4-06 (% of population) 
 ‘a’ areas ‘c’ areas TOTAL 
Austria 3.5 24.1 27.6 
Belgium  30.9 30.9 
Cyprus  100.0 100.0 
Czech Rep 88.6 11.4 100.0 
Denmark  17.1 17.1 
Estonia 100.0  100.0 
Finland 13.4 28.9 42.3 
France 2.8 33.9 36.7 
Germany 17.2 17.7 34.9 
Greece 100.0  100.0 
Hungary 100.0  100.0 
Ireland 26.6 73.4 100.0 
Italy 33.6 10.0 43.6 
Latvia 100.0  100.0 
Lithuania 100.0  100.0 
Luxembourg  32.0 32.0 
Malta 100.0  100.0 
Netherlands  15.0 15.0 
Poland 100.0  100.0 
Portugal 66.6 33.4 100.0 
Slovenia 100.0  100.0 
Slovakia 100.0  100.0 
Spain 58.4 20.8 79.2 
Sweden  15.9 15.9 
UK 8.6 22.1 30.7 
EU25 34.3 18.0 52.3 
EU15 21.9 21.1 43.0 
NMS10 97.6 2.4 100.0 
Note: New Member States’ (NMS10) maps were approved by the European Commission 
from 2004. 
Source: Wishlade (2003) Figure 34 at p 205; DG Competition website at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/regional/ (accessed March 2006); and 
author’s calculations. 
Page 31 of 37
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 32 
Table 2: Coverage under the first Commission proposals for 2007-13concentration 
scenario (% of population) 
  ‘a’ areas 
‘c’ areas - 
statistical 
effect 
‘c’ areas - 
economic 
growth 
‘c’ areas - 
sparsely-
populated 
‘c’ areas 
total  TOTAL 
Austria    3.4    3.4 3.4 
Belgium    12.4     12.4 12.4 
Cyprus            0.0 
Czech Rep 88.6         88.6 
Denmark            0.0 
Estonia  100.0       100.0 
Finland      13.0 10.7 23.7 23.7 
France  2.7         2.7 
Germany  12.5 6.1     6.1 18.6 
Greece  36.6 55.5 7.8   63.4 100.0 
Hungary  72.2   27.8   27.8 100.0 
Ireland      26.5   26.5 26.5 
Italy  29.2 1.0 2.9   3.9 33.1 
Latvia  100.0         100.0 
Lithuania  100.0         100.0 
Luxembourg           0.0 
Malta  100.0         100.0 
Netherlands           0.0 
Poland  100.0         100.0 
Portugal  70.1 3.8     3.8 74.0 
Slovakia  88.9         88.9 
Slovenia  100.0         100.0 
Spain  36 5.9 16.3 0.3 22.5 58.6 
Sweden        13.0 13.0 13.0 
UK  4.0 0.6 4.4   5.1 9.1 
EU25 27.7 3.6 3.6 0.4 7.6 35.3 
EU15 15.0 4.3 3.5 0.5 8.2 23.3 
NMS10 92.9 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.9 96.7 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
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Table 3: Aid area coverage 2007-2013 (under the 2006 guidelines (% of population)) 
 ‘a’ areas ‘a’ areas - 
statistical 
effect 
Earmarked 
‘c’ areas 
TOTAL Non-
earmarked 
‘c’ areas 
Transitional ‘c’ 
areas  
Austria   3.4 19.1 22.5 19.1  
Belgium   12.4 13.5 25.9 13.5  
Cyprus    50.0 50.0 50.0 16.0 
Czech Rep 88.6   88.6  7.7 
Denmark    8.6 8.6 8.6 2.7 
Estonia  100.0   100.0   
Finland    33.0 33.0 9.3  
France  2.9  15.5 18.4 15.5 6.9 
Germany  12.5 6.1 11.0 29.6 11.0  
Greece  36.6 55.5 7.9 100.0   
Hungary  72.2  27.8 100.0   
Ireland    50.0 50.0 23.5 25.0 
Italy  29.2 1.0 3.9 34.1 1.0 5.6 
Latvia  100.0   100.0   
Lithuania  100.0   100.0   
Luxembourg    16.0 16.0 16.0 5.1 
Malta  100.0   100.0   
Netherlands    7.5 7.5 7.5 2.4 
Poland  100.0   100.0   
Portugal  70.1 3.8 2.8 76.7 2.8 19.2 
Slovakia  88.9   88.9  7.5 
Slovenia  100.0   100.0   
Spain  36.2 5.8 17.7 59.6 1.1 12.4 
Sweden    15.3 15.3 2.3  
UK  4.0 0.6 19.3 23.9 14.9  
EU25 27.7 3.6 11.8 43.1 7.8 3.8 
EU15 15.0 4.3 13.2 32.5 9.2 4.2 
NMS10 92.9 0.0 4.3 97.1 0.5 1.8 
Notes: After 2010 some statistical effect regions may be ‘downgraded’ from ‘a’ to ‘c’. Non-
earmarked ‘c’ areas are those not classified as economic growth or sparsely-populated areas; 
these are included in the total. Transitional ‘c’ areas will lose aid area status at end 2008; 
these are not included in the total. 
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Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2006) and author’s calculations. 
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Table 4: Maximum rates of award for large firms (% of eligible investment) 
Concentration scenario Continuity scenario  
Working paper Non-paper 2006 guidelinesa 
‘a’ areas < 45% GDP 
b
 
50 40 50 
‘a’ areas < 60% GDP 40 35 40 
‘a’ areas < 75% GDP 30 30 30 
Statistical effect 30->20 30->15 30->20 
Sparsely populated 20 20 15 
Economic growth 20 15 15/10 
Other ‘c’ areas ~ ~ 15/10 
Maximum rate 
differential 
0 30 20 
Notes: Maximum rates are raised by 10 percentage points for medium-sized firms and 20 
percentage points for small firms. a) Rates remained unchanged between the draft and final 
guidelines; b) Threshold set at 50 per cent of EU25 GDP in Working Paper.  
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1
 That is, excluding agriculture, fisheries, coal and transport. 
2
 Essentially social aid and aid to compensate for natural disasters (Article 87(2)). 
3
 Except measure that conform to one of the block exemption regulations see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/block.html (Accessed 
March 2006). 
4
 Case 248/84 Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European 
Communities [1987] ECR 4013. 
5
 Measured in purchasing power standards (PPS) over the last three years at NUTS II; 
the same definition as Objective 1 under the Structural Funds. 
6
 Compared with previous coverage of 46.7 per cent. 
7
 Expressed in net grant-equivalent (NGE). This refers to the after-tax value of 
assistance and until 2006 was used by the Commission for comparing the value of all 
forms of regional aid. 
8
 For a small number of industries special aid rules applied, notably: coal and steel, 
shipbuilding, synthetic fibres and motor vehicles.  
9
 This has never been published but was kindly provided to the author by several 
national regional policymakers.  
10
 Guyane, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, Madeira, Azores and Canaries. 
Page 36 of 37
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 37 
                                                                                                                                            
11
 Reflecting the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, the Outermost regions were 
also included in the ‘a’ areas. 
12
 The equivalent threshold to 75 per cent of the EU15 average is 82.2 per cent of the 
EU25 average, on the basis of GDP data for 2000-2. 
13
 The draft LASA and LET frameworks were available on DG Competition’s 
website, but were withdrawn in 2005; for an overview of the proposals see 
WISHLADE 2004. 
14
 C-242/00 Germany v European Commission [2002] ECR I-05603. 
15
 The Advocate General prepares an Opinion to assist the European Court of Justice. 
This is not binding, but in this case it was followed. 
16
 This being the amount of aid that a €100 million project could receive in the area 
concerned, so that the threshold is in effect raised in higher rate regions. For a €500 
million project the rate at which aid is notifiable is 2.25 per cent of eligible 
expenditure in a 15 per cent rate region and 4.5 per cent in a 30 per cent rate region. 
17
 Member States have long been obliged to provide annual reports detailing the major 
aid beneficiaries. 
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